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WASHINGTON COURTS GET STINGY: IMPROPER
DENIAL OF ATTORNEY'S FEES UNDER 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983
AND 1988
Brian Buckley
Abstract: 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 allow persons to challenge state laws that violate
their federal constitutional rights and to recover their attorney's fees should they prevail. This
Comment analyzes two recent Washington cases in which the plaintiffs were denied fee
recoveries despite having successfully challenged state statutes. This Comment then argues
that fee awards should have been granted in both cases and that in the future fee awards
should rarely be denied when plaintiffs invalidate state law under §§ 1983 and 1988.
Both 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 are crucial tools for preserving
individual rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United
States. Section 1983 establishes a federal cause of action for deprivation
of civil rights under the auspices of state authority. Section 1988 is an
adjunct to § 1983 and other federal civil rights laws and allows a
prevailing civil rights litigant to recover reasonable attorney's fees.
Congress has recognized that the effective vindication of civil rights
depends substantially on private enforcement.' Congress enacted § 1983
to empower persons to act as "private attorneys general" to ensure that
state civil rights violations are challenged and corrected.2 To assist such
an effort, the fee shifting provisions under § 1988 allow the private
litigant to bring a civil rights challenge despite the prohibitive cost of
protracted litigation. Together, these statutes also deter the violation of
constitutional rights by state authorities. The dual goals of vindication
and deterrence have long been recognized in the legislative history of
civil rights legislation and the corresponding case law.
In 1994, two high-profile Washington cases, Soundgarden v.
Eikenberry4 (Soundgarden) and Thorsted v. Gregoire5 (Thorsted),
involved constitutional challenges to state statutes under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. In both cases, the prevailing plaintiffs were denied recovery of
their attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 despite the established
purposes of §§ 1983 and 1988.
1. S. Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5910.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. 123 Wash. 2d 750,871 P.2d 1050 (1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 663 (1994).
5. 841 F. Supp. 1068 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
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This Comment analyzes the application of §§ 1983 and 1988 in
Soundgarden and Thorsted. Part I briefly summarizes the histories of
§§ 1983 and 1988 and the goals those sections were iatended to serve.
Part II analyzes Soundgarden and Thorsted, respectively, and argues that
the denial of attorney's fees was improper in both cases. Finally, part III
discusses the policies that should guide the future application of §§ 1983
and 1988 by Washington courts.
I. THE HISTORIES OF 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 AND 19:38
Both 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 are links in an extended chain of
federal civil rights legislation aimed at securing individual constitutional
liberties against attacks from all quarters. The histories of these sections
reveal that Congress intended them to have an expansive scope and to
grant significant power to private litigants.
A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
"The very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts
between the States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal
rights."
6
Congress originally enacted § 1983 as the first section of The Civil
Rights Act of 1871, which was modeled after a section of The Civil
Rights Act of 1866. 7 The Civil Rights Act of 1871, alternatively known
as the "Ku Klux Act," was a response to the unequal, and often violent,
treatment of blacks in the southern states following the Civil War. In
particular, southern state governments were not taking steps to curb the
mounting power of white supremacist groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan,
or to stem the tide of civil rights violations against blacks and white
sympathizers!
The civil rights acts of the late nineteenth century were a federal
attempt to vindicate constitutional rights when the states had failed to do
so.9 The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that the section that became §
1983 was intended to provide a federal remedy for violations, under the
6. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225,242 (1972).
7. 1 Bernard Schwartz, Statutory History of the United States: Civil Rights 591 (1970).
8. Id.
9. Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 239.
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authority of state law, of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of
the nation.'0 Currently, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 reads as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of
Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall
be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia."
In addition to providing the means to vindicate civil rights, § 1983 is
also intended to deter unconstitutional state action. 2 The U.S. Supreme
Court has stated that the purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from
using their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed
rights and to provide relief if that deterrence fails. 3 The deterrent effect
of § 1983 resides in the message that constitutional violations will not go
unchallenged and may result in substantial monetary awards.
The Supreme Court also has stated that § 1983 should be interpreted
broadly to address all forms of state violation of federally protected
rights.'4 Further, the Court has made it clear that unconstitutional state
action may be challenged whether that action is executive, legislative, or
judicial in nature.' As a consequence of the expansive scope and broad
application of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it has become, in the words of former
Justice Powell, the "most explosive source of Federal jurisdiction."' 6
10. Id. at 239.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
12. Wyatt v. Cole, 112 S. Ct. 1827, 1830 (1992).
13. Id. at 1830.
14. Monell v, New York City Dep't of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 700-01 (1978).
15. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972) (quoting Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346
(1880)).
16. Lewis F. Powell, Are the Federal Courts BecomingBureaucracies?, 68 A.B.A. J. 1370, 1371
(Nov. 1982).
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B. 42 U.S.C. § 1988
"The purpose of§ 1988 is to ensure effective access to the judicial
proces for persons with civil rights grievances. "17
Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in 1976 as "the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act. 8 The relevant portion of the statute reads
as follows:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981,
1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public
Law 92-318, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, or
title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United
States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.19
This section thus grants the federal courts discretion to award
attorney's fees to parties who obtain relief under any of the civil rights
laws enacted since the end of the Civil War.
20
The enactment of § 1988 was a direct response by Congress to the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v.
Wilderness Society.2 In that case, the Court held that Congress alone
had the power to declare which federal laws would support an award of
attorney's fees.' The decision appeared to disallow fee awards under
statutes which lacked express authorization for such awards. Congress
responded by making fee awards appropriate for all civil rights
legislation.
The primary purpose of § 1988 is to provide the private litigant access
to the legal process. Congress has stated, "[a]ll of these civil rights laws
depend heavily upon private enforcement, and fee awards have proved
an essential remedy if private citizens are to have a meaningful
opportunity to vindicate the important Congressional. policies which
17. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,429 (1983) (citation omitted).
18. Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1988).
20. S. Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5909.
See infra note 67 for a discussion of what renders a party "prevailing" for the purposes of a fee
award.
21. 421 U.S. 240 (1975). See 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5909.
22. Alyeska, 421 U.S. 240, 262 (1975). In Alyeska, the Court stated, "the circumstances under
which attorney's fees are to be awarded and the range of discretion of the courts in making those
awards are matters for Congress to determine." Id.
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these laws contain." The access provided by § 1988 is practical.
Although § 1983 and other civil rights laws allow citizens theoretical
access to the courts, § 1988 dismantles the actual prohibitive hurdle
posed by the cost of legal representation.
Congress also intended § 1988 to encourage competent attorneys to
represent clients with civil rights claims through the promise of a full
recovery of fees.2' At least one court has also held that attorneys should
be rewarded through fee recovery for accepting novel or challenging
civil rights litigation.'
The scope and goals of § 1988, like those of § 1983, are broad and
demand liberal application. Congress has mandated that courts use the
most expansive and effective remedies available to enforce the civil
rights laws.26 Consequently, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that
awards of attorney's fees under civil rights legislation, such as § 1983,
are to be the rule, rather than the exception.
1I. ANALYSIS OF SOUNDGARDENAND THORSTED
The legislative and legal histories of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988
make it clear that attorney's fees are to be liberally granted in civil rights
actions and that private civil rights litigants are to be both encouraged
and assisted in their efforts. However, two recent cases in Washington
have flouted the purposes of §§ 1983 and 1988 by searching for reasons
to deny, rather than grant, attorney's fees.
Soundgarden v. Eikenberr z  invalidated as unconstitutional
Washington's Erotic Music Statute, which regulated the dissemination of
sexually explicit material to minors.29 The court refused to recognize the
plaintiffs' § 1983 claim or address the issue of attorney's fees because
the unconstitutional statute at issue had never been enforced." Thorsted
v. Gregoire"M struck down as unconstitutional a state ballot access statute,
which established term limits for Washington members of the United
23. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908,5910.
24. Id. at 5913.
25. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714,718 (5th Cir. 1974).
26. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5910-11.
27. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983).
28. 123 Wash. 2d 750, 871 P.2d 1050 (1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 663 (1994).
29. Wash. Rev. Code §§ 9.68.050-.070, .090 (1994).
30. Soundgarden, 123 Wash. 2d at 776, 871 P.2d at 1064.
31. 841 F. Supp. 1068 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
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States Senate and House of Representatives. The court recognized the
plaintiffs' § 1983 claim, but denied attorney's fees under § 1988 based
on special circumstances which would have rendered a fee award
unjust.32 This section analyzes Soundgarden and Thc'rsted and argues
that, in both cases, precedent and policy warranted an award of
reasonable attorney's fees to the plaintiffs.
A. Soundgarden v. Eikenberry: Misapplication of§ 1983
1. Case History
In 1992, the Washington legislature passed the Erotic Sound
Recordings statute,33 which amended a prior statute governing the
distribution of obscene materials to minors. The Erotic Sound
Recordings statute, known alternatively as the Erotiz Music Statute,
defines erotic material and prohibits the display and di;tribution of such
material to minors. The 1992 amendment added sound recordings to the
list of material which may be judged erotic, a list. that previously
consisted of exclusively visual material.
Prior to any enforcement of the Erotic Music Statute, a suit was filed
in superior court to challenge the constitutionality of the new law. The
plaintiffs in the suit consisted of musical groups, recording companies,
record stores, and private persons, represented by the recording group
Soundgarden.34 The plaintiffs alleged that the Erotic Music Statute
violated their rights of free speech and due process, guaranteed by the
state and federal constitutions, and sought declaratory and injunctive
relief.35  Plaintiffs brought suit under the Washinlgon Declaratory
Judgment Act 36 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and specifically sought an award
of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.37
The superior court found the Erotic Music Statute unconstitutional and
enjoined its enforcement by the defendants, the State Attorney General
and County Prosecutor.38  The court held that the statute violated the
32. Id. at 1084.
33. Wash. Rev. Code §§ 9.68.050-.070, .090 (1994).
34. Soundgarden, 123 Wash. 2d at 753, 871 P.2d at 1052.
35. Id. at 754, 871 P.2d at 1053.
36. Wash. Rev. Code § 7.24. Wash. Rev. Code § 7.24.020 provides that a person "whose rights,
status or other legal relations are affected by a statute... may have determined any question of
construction or validity arising under [it]."
37. Soundgarden, 123 Wash. 2d at 754, 871 P.2d at 1053.
38. Id. at 753, 871 P.2d at 1052.
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plaintiffs' right to free speech by causing artists to censor the content of
their music in order to avoid criminal prosecution.39 Unchallenged
plaintiffs' affidavits established a pervasive chilling effect on expression,
affecting the individual plaintiffs' ability to produce, distribute, or
acquire certain forms of protected speech.' Additionally, the court held
that the statute violated due process.4" Despite acknowledging that the
plaintiffs' constitutional rights had been violated, the court declined to
award attorney's fees, reasoning that the case was brought under the
Washington Declaratory Judgment Act,42 which did not provide for such
fees.43
In 1994, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the rulings of the
trial court on the unconstitutionality of the Erotic Music Statute and its
denial of attorney's fees." In its discussion of the fee issue, the court
recognized respondents' argument that the discretion to deny fees under
§ 1988 is extremely narrow.45 However, it went on to state that an
individual's civil rights must be infringed before suit may be brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court held that, because neither the
Attorney General nor County Prosecutor had ever tried to enforce the
Erotic Music Statute, no infringement had occurred.46 To support its
proposition, the court cited five Washington cases brought under § 1983,
stating that in each case "a governmental entity or official had sought to
enforce a statute, ordinance or policy prior to being sued.. . ." The
court entered a ruling under the state Declaratory Judgment Act and
never reached the specific issue of whether attorney's fees were
appropriate under § 1988.
2. The Court Should Have Applied § 1983
The court's failure in Soundgarden to recognize the plaintiffs' claim
under § 1983, despite the existence of a present and pervasive
39. Id. at 755, 871 P.2d at 1053.
40. Id. at 763, 871 P.2d at 1057.
41. Id. at 755, 871 P.2d at 1053.
42. The case does not address why rights which are sufficiently "affected" to allow suit under the
Declaratory Judgment Act are not "infringed" for the purposes of § 1983.
43. Soundgarden, 123 Wash. 2d at 756, 871 P.2d at 1053.
44. Id. at 753, 871 P.2d at 1052.
45. Id. at 776, 871 P.2d at 1064. The respondents were quoting Herrington v. County of Sonoma,
883 F.2d 739, 743 (9th Cir. 1989)).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 776 n.76, 871 P.2d at 1064 n.76.
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constitutional deprivation, is in conflict with precedent, as well as the
spirit and purpose of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. Contrary to the
court's decision, it is established that suit may be brought under § 1983,
and fees awarded under § 1988, despite the fact that the offending statute
has never been enforced.
a. United States Supreme Court Precedent
Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States support the
ability of a private litigant to challenge a statute or orinance under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 prior to enforcement of the law. In Virginia v. American
Booksellers Ass'n (American Booksellers),48 the Court invalidated a
"harmful to minors" statute that was functionally similar to the Erotic
Music Statute in Soundgarden.49 Suit was brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, despite the fact that the statute in question had never been
enforced. The state officials defended the action on the ground that no
infringement of civil rights had occurred, in harmony with the reasoning
of the Soundgarden court.50
In rejecting the defendants' claim that no infringement had occurred,
the Supreme Court stated that it was not troubled by the pre-enforcement
nature of the suit.5' The Court referred to the fact that the plaintiffs had
demonstrated a real and reasonable fear that the statute would be
enforced against them, and there was no evidence to suggest that it
would not.52 More importantly, the statute in American Booksellers was
found to be in violation of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights of free
speech and expression. The Court stated that the primary danger of the
statute was self-censorship, a harm that can accrue without an actual
prosecution.53 The Supreme Court recognized that pre-enforcement
censorship, like that suffered by the plaintiffs in Soundgarden, will
support a civil rights challenge under § 1983.
A similar result was reached in Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland
Independent School District,' where the Court invdidated a school
48. 484 U.S. 383 (1988).
49. The Virginia statute prohibited persons from openly displaying, for commercial purposes,
visual or written material that was sexually explicit and thus harmful to juveidles. Id. at 386.
50. Id. at 392-93.
51. Id. at 393.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. School Dist., 489 U.S. 782 (1989).
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district regulation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, although the offending
section of the regulation had never been enforced. The portion of the
regulation that the Court found to be unconstitutional prohibited certain
communications between teachers using school mail or public address
systems. No teacher had been disciplined under the rule, but the Fifth
Circuit stated that the rule nevertheless chilled teacher speech in
violation of the First Amendment." The Supreme Court affirmed that
this pre-enforcement chilling was sufficient to support the § 1983
claim.
56
It is clear from Supreme Court rulings that the chilling of free speech
that an unconstitutional state law may occasion, even prior to its
enforcement, infringes civil rights by encouraging self-censorship. In
addition, a number of circuit and district court cases have rejected the
reasoning used by the court in Soundgarden and allowed § 1983 claims
prior to enforcement of the offending state law. 7
55. Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. School Dist., 777 F.2d 1046, 1055 (5th Cir.
1985), af'd, 489 U.S. 782 (1989).
56. Garland, 489 U.S. at 793.
57. In re Kansas Cong. Dists. Reapportionment, 745 F.2d 610 (10th Cir. 1984), involved a
challenge under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to congressional districts in the state of Kansas. Although the
defendant Secretary of State had never enforced the districts, the trial court found the districts
unconstitutional and awarded the plaintiffs their attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The
defendants appealed to the Tenth Circuit, proffering the theory relied upon by the court in
Soundgarden, that, absent enforcement, the unconstitutional districts could not infringe the
plaintiffs' civil rights.
In rejecting the defendants' argument, the Tenth Circuit held that a threat to a plaintiffs'
constitutional rights was sufficient to support a claim under § 1983. Id at 612. The court
emphasized that the Secretary of State was the official responsible for enforcing the congressional
districts and that the plaintiffs were not required to accept his promise that enforcement would never
occur. Id. The plaintiffs prevailed and were subsequently awarded fees under § 1988.
A pre-enforcement challenge to a state statute under § 1983 was also recently allowed in federal
district court in Washington. Thorsted v. Gregoire, 841 F. Supp. 1068 (W.D. Wash. 1994), the other
case discussed in this Comment, involved a challenge to a state ballot access statute. The defendant
Secretary of State and Attorney General relied on the fact that the statute had never been enforced in
arguing that plaintiffs' § 1983 claim should not be allowed. The court rejected this argument,
stating, "threatened harm that has not yet occurred, but that will occur unless judicial relief is
afforded, is enough to support a civil rights claim." Id at 1083 (citation omitted). Although fees
were denied under § 1988 on other grounds, the court recognized the plaintiffs' § 1983 claim and
applied a full analysis under § 1988.
See also Auburn Police Union v. Carpenter, 8 F.3d 886 (1st Cir. 1993); Sequoia Bookstore, Inc. v.
Ingemunson, 901 F.2d 630 (7th Cir. 1990); Sable Communs. of California, Inc. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel.
Co., 890 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1989); Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati,
822 F.2d 1390 (6th Cir. 1987); Septum, Inc. v. Keller, 614 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1980). All of these
cases recognized the viability ofpre-enforcement challenges under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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The five Washington cases cited by the Soundgarde, court to support
its holding involved laws which had been enforced prior to being
challenged. None of those cases, however, required that § 1983 claims
be predicated on such enforcement."
b. Purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1983
In addition to contradicting precedent, Soundgarden's holding that
private litigants may not seek federal vindication of their civil rights until
the unconstitutional state law at issue has been enforced against them,
contravenes the recognized function and purpose of § 1983.
A primary purpose of § 1983 is to serve as a shield for individual civil
rights, 9 The statute provides a federal remedy for the state occasioned
deprivation of any rights or privileges secured by the Constitution and
federal laws.6 ° The refusal in Soundgarden to recogn:ize the plaintiffs'
claim under § 1983 is tantamount to an assertion that, absent actual
enforcement of an unconstitutional law, no quantum of harm amounts to
a deprivation of civil rights.
The plaintiffs in Soundgarden alleged a number of specific harms they
were suffering under the Erotic Music Statute, despite lack of
enforcement. The artists stated that they were forced to censor the
content of their music and curtail their creativity in order to avoid loss of
sales. Record retailers stated that they had canceled orders for and
reduced distribution of records that they suspected might be judged
erotic, in order to avoid criminal prosecution. These allegations went
unchallenged by the state and were relied upon by the Soundgarden court
as indicative of a restraint on free speech.6"
The Erotic Music Statute effectively hindered freedom of speech
despite the fact that it had not been officially enforced. It did so by
coercing self-censorship, a harm that can result even without an actual
prosecution.62 It caused a curtailment of expression and a concrete loss
of revenue. Under Soundgarden's reasoning, however, in the absence of
58. See Collier v. Tacoma, 121 Wash. 2d 737, 854 P.2d 1046 (1993); Ryder v. Port of Seattle, 50
Wash. App. 144, 748 P.2d 243 (1987); Duranceau v. Tacoma, 37 Wash. App. 846, 684 P.2d 1311
(1984); Rains v. State, 100 Wash. 2d 660, 674 P.2d 165 (1983); Jacobsen v. Seattle, 98 Wash. 2d
668, 658 P.2d 653 (1983).
59. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
61. Soundgarden v. Eikenberry, 123 Wash. 2d 750, 763, 871 P.2d 1(150, 1057 (1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 663 (1994).




the state Declaratory Judgment Act, the plaintiffs would have been
without recourse until faced with actual prosecution. In the interim, they
would have been forced to endure deprivations of their civil rights,
despite the existence of a specific federal remedy in § 1983.
Failure to allow pre-enforcement challenges under § 1983 also
undermines the goal of deterrence. One aim of the statute is to deter state
legislatures from passing unconstitutional laws.63  Holding that
enforcement is a necessary predicate to a civil rights challenge sends a
message to legislatures that an unconstitutional law may still exert
profound and pervasive influence with relative impunity, at least until the
time of enforcement. In the worst case scenario, such a law coupled with
an unspoken policy of non-enforcement could result in protracted civil
rights deprivations with no remedy under § 1983. This result is clearly
contrary to the intent of § 1983 to address all unconstitutional state
action, whether that action is executive, legislative, or judicial in nature.'
Requiring executive enforcement as a precondition to a § 1983 claim
makes it impossible to challenge purely legislative state action.
Lastly, the holding in Soundgarden is inconsistent with the broad
construction and application that should be applied to § 1983. A primary
goal of the statute is to assist the individual in stemming unconstitutional
state action before it results in a widespread deprivation of rights.65 The
idea of interposing the federal courts between the states and the people66
suggests removing barriers to civil rights challenges, rather than erecting
them. Requiring enforcement of a state law when it is causing
measurable and observable harm to civil rights places a purely technical
hurdle in the path of justice.
c. Summary
The complaining parties in the Soundgarden case faced both the
immediate deprivation of their civil rights through a chilling of their right
to free expression, as well as the threat of future prosecution under an
unconstitutional statute. The weight of precedent establishes that even
the threat of civil rights infringement at the hands of the state, and
certainly an immediate harm such as self-censorship, entitles a person to
seek vindication under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Before Soundgarden, it was
63. See Wyatt v. Cole, 112 S. Ct. 1827, 1830 (1992).
64. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225,242 (1972).
65. See Teitelbaum v. Sorenson, 648 F.2d 1248, 1250 (9th Cir. 1981).
66. Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 242.
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well-settled federal authority that a person need not await actual
enforcement of an unconstitutional law before being empowered to serve
the role of private attorney general. The court in Soundgarden should
have recognized the application of plaintiffs' § 1983 claim and then
granted their request for reasonable attorney's fees as pievailing parties. 7
B. Thorsted v. Gregoire: Misapplication of§ 1988
1. Case History
In 1992, Washington voters approved Initiative Measure 573, a ballot
access statute which amended and made additions to a number of
chapters in the Revised Code of Washington.68 The .,tatute established
limits on the number of terms persons might serve in the United States
Senate and House of Representatives. The Secretary of State was
prohibited from accepting a declaration of candidacy from persons
barred by the statute, although they were allowed to run a write-in
campaign.
69
Prior to any enforcement under the term limits statute, suit was filed in
federal district court to challenge the constitutionality of the measure.
The plaintiffs in the case consisted primarily of registered Washington
voters, but they were joined by Thomas Foley, who had represented the
Fifth Congressional District of Washington in Congres; since 1965. The
plaintiffs alleged that the term limits statute violated their rights under
the federal Constitution to free association and political expression, and
67. The court did not entertain the plaintiffs' claim under § 1983 and, corsequently, never applied
a full analysis under § 1988. In order to recover attorney's fees under § 1'88, a plaintiff must be a
"prevailing party" under a federal civil rights law. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a party
prevails if it succeeds on any significant issue in the litigation and achieves some of the benefit it
sought in bringing suit. Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. School Dist., 489 U.S. 782,
792 (1989). To confer prevailing party status, a victory must alter the legal relationship between the
parties and modify the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits tae plaintiff at the time of
judgment. Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S. Ct. 566, 573 (1992).
The Soundgarden plaintiffs were suffering measurable harm under the Erotic Music Statute,
despite lack of enforcement. The court's holding changed the parties' legal relationship and
modified the behavior of the defendant state officials by removing their ability to enforce the statute,
the very result the plaintiffs hoped to achieve when they filed suit. This result was of immediate and
profound benefit to the plaintiffs because it dissolved the chilling of theh" free speech. Thus, the
Soundgarden plaintiffs were "prevailing parties" under § 1983 and should have been awarded their
attorney's fees under § 1988.
68. Initiative Measure 573 added new sections to chapters 7.16, 29.15, 29.51, 29.68, 43.01, and
44.04 of the Revised Code of Washington in 1994.
69. Thorsted v. Gregoire, 841 F. Supp. 1068, 1071 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
'Vol. 70:491, 1995
Attorney's Fees
sought declaratory and injunctive relief. As defendants, the Washington
Secretary of State and Attorney General were named in their official
capacities. In addition to seeking invalidation of the statute under the
Constitution, the plaintiffs sought specific relief under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983
and 1988.70
In Thorsted, the court found in favor of the plaintiffs and held that the
term limits sections of Initiative 573 were unconstitutional. The court
found that the statute violated Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution, by
adding additional restrictions on membership in the United States House
and Senate, which is beyond the power of state government.71 The court
further held that the statute violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments by restricting political opportunity and curtailing freedom
of association.' The defendants were enjoined from enforcing the term
limits portions of the measure.73 With regard to the plaintiffs' civil rights
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court stated that the same relief was
appropriate as that granted under the constitutional claims.74
The Thorsted court recognized the plaintiffs' § 1983 claim, despite the
pre-enforcement nature of the suit. It held that, because the threatened
enforcement would deprive the plaintiffs of their constitutional rights,
they were entitled to injunctive and declaratory relief under Section
1983.' 5 However, it went on to state that such relief did not guarantee a
fee award. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that a prevailing party
"should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances
would render such an award unjust."'76 Courts have discretion to award
fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and the meaning of "special circumstances"
has been left to be developed through case law.77
The Thorsted court identified seven "special circumstanices" that it
found counseled against such an award.78 Furthermore, the court
70. Id. at 1072.




75. Id. at 1083.
76. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,429 (1983) (citation omitted).
77. Teitelbaum v. Sorenson, 648 F.2d 1248, 1249 (9th Cir. 1981).
78. The special circumstances identified by the court were as follows:
1. No award is needed to serve the purpose of Section 1988, which is to assure 'effective access
to the judicial process.' Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429. This is not a typical civil rights case. The
mere filing of suit by anyone with standing would have assured a full court test. See the briefs
ofamicus curiae, which demonstrate this.
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distinguished contrary authority, relying on the "totality of
circumstances" present in the Thorsted case, and held that an award of
attorney's fees would be "manifestly unfair.
79
2. Attorney's Fees Should Have Been Awarded
The plaintiffs in the Thorsted case should have been granted their
reasonable attorney's fees under § 1988. The special circumstances
identified by the court do not comport with precedent and the purpose of
civil rights legislation in general, and § 1988 in particular. The sections
that follow analyze each of the court's identified special circumstances in
turn.
a. Award Unnecessary for Effective Access
The Thorsted court's assertion that attorney's fees were unnecessary
to assure effective access to the judicial process misrepresents the true
role of § 1988. The access which is afforded by the Attorney's Fees
Awards Act is practical access, the means by which private litigants can
benefit from available remedies." Technical issues, such as the right to
bring a civil rights claim or standing to sue, are addressed by federal
2. No relief has been won under the Section 1983 claims beyond that already awarded under the
constitutional claims.
3. The legislation that prompted the suit was adopted by a voters' initiative, not by State
officials. The deterrence purpose of Section 1983, see Wyatt v. Cole, 112 S. Ct. 1827, 1830
(1992), is inapplicable.
4. The defendant officials have not yet enforced Initiative 573. Their willingness to do so if it
is upheld reflects only the minimum their oaths of office require. Cf. May v. Cooperman, 578 F.
Supp. 1308 (D.N.J. 1984) (denying attorney fees as against state officials who took no action to
enforce an unconstitutional statute, but granting them against state legislators who intervened).
5. The State officials have acted in good faith. 'The Ninth Circuit has ruled that a defendant's
good faith is one factor of several that a court may consider in applying the Attorney's Fees
Act.' Teitelbaum v. Sorenson, 648 F.2d 1248, 1250 (9th Cir. 1981).
6. This is a case of first impression in federal court, and the public interest requires that it be
adjudicated through a full adversary process. The State defendants have done nothing to
increase the litigation costs beyond what would have been necessary in any event.
7. There was no way for the State officials to settle the case by agreement. Even if a stipulation
of unconstitutionality had been entered (a most unlikely event), the court would have rejected it.
State legislation is presumed constitutional until the contrary is shown. Clements v. Fashing,
457 U.S. at 963-64.
Thorsted, 841 F. Supp. at 1084 (parallel citations omitted).
79. Id. (citation omitted).
80. S. Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5910.
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legislation, such as § 1983, or federal case law. The purpose of 42
U.S.C. § 1988 is to guarantee that persons can afford to avail themselves
of judicial relief.
81
The court reasoned that "the mere filing of suit by anyone with
standing to sue would have assured a full court test." 2 However, the
Thorsted court failed to acknowledge the difference between the doctrine
of standing and the concept of practical access to the court system. It
cannot be argued that a case can effectively proceed on its own, without
the diligence and continuing involvement of the plaintiffs and their
counsel. The cost of that continuing involvement in attorney's fees may
well be prohibitive for many private litigants. In a sense, statutes such as
§ 1983 leave the civil rights plaintiff at the courtroom door; they have
helped to get the plaintiff's case into court, but the problem of cost is the
litigant's alone to bear. It is precisely at this point that § 1988 is
available, allowing plaintiffs to pursue the vindication that the civil rights
laws offer.
The goal of § 1988 to encourage "private attorneys general" to
challenge unconstitutional state action is undermined by a holding, at the
close of a civil rights case, that effective access has already been afforded
and a fee award is unnecessary. Effective access entails the ability to
carry a challenge through to completion. Had a prevailing litigant been
aware at the outset of a civil rights case that attorney's fees would be
denied and he or she would be left to bear the full cost of litigation, the
litigant might well have been dissuaded from even filing a claim. A
policy that fees will be denied retrospectively once a claim is successful
deflates the primary role of § 1988 by making the incentive of cost
recovery an artificial one. As stated in the legislative history of § 1988,
courts must continue to shift fees in civil rights cases if the civil rights
laws are not to become meaningless pronouncements that citizens cannot
afford to enforce. 3
b. No Additional Relief Won Under § 1983
Claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are predicated on violations
by state authority of the federal Constitution or federal laws.84  It is
axiomatic that state laws that are inconsistent with the United States
81. Id.
82. Thorsted, 841 F. Supp. at 1084.
83. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5913.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
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Constitution cannot stand." Consequently, in every civil rights
challenge to an unconstitutional state statute under § 1983, the
invalidation of the law itself will be guaranteed by general rules of
Constitutional law. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized
that the Thorsted scenario is common, as a large numb-er of civil rights
claimants seek only injunctive or declaratory relief. 6 The Court further
recognized that awards of attorney's fees in such cases are especially
important to assure judicial access because the plaintiff will not receive
monetary damages to offset the cost of litigation. 7
The need to assure practical access to judicial relief is no less real
where that relief is alternatively available under the Constitution. The
private litigant seeking to invalidate a law that is depriving him or her of
civil rights should not care on what specific grounds that relief is
afforded. The issue of prohibitive legal cost will loom just as large,
whatever the final outcome. The role of §§ 1983 and 1988 in
encouraging "private attorneys general" to vindicate their
constitutionally guaranteed civil rights takes place at Ihe front end of
litigation, influencing the decision to file a claim. Under Thorsted's
reasoning, the incentive of attorney's fees will be lost in every § 1983
case that seeks relief that is also available through alternative sources.
The potential exclusion of such a large body of "private attorneys
general" is certainly contrary to the goals of the civil rights laws.8
c. The Statute Was a Voters' Initiative
The court also held that because the term limits statute was adopted
through a voters' initiative, rather than being passed by the Washington
state legislature, the deterrence goal of § 1983 did not apply in the
Thorsted case. It is admittedly unlikely that a fee award assessed against
the state in a particular case would deter the body of private citizens from
voting for future initiatives that are of questionable constitutional
validity.
It is important to reemphasize, however, that while deterrence is a
central goal of § 1983, it is secondary to the goal of providing a remedy
for the deprivation of civil rights. 9 The civil rights laws were originally
85. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
86. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522,527 n.4 (1984).
87. Id.
88. S. Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5910.




passed to provide persons a federal remedy where state law failed to do
so.90  Where civil rights are being deprived, for the purposes of
individual vindication it is irrelevant that the law is the result of a voters'
initiative.91 Diluting the deterrence effect in a particular case does not
render § 1983 a dead letter, nor does it make § 1988 any less important
in assuring judicial access. 9
In addition, the fact that the particular statute in Thorsted was adopted
by a voters' initiative does not necessarily vitiate the general deterrence
goals of §§ 1983 and 1988. The deterrence effect of §§ 1983 and 1988
lies in the uniformity of civil rights enforcement, in the repeated message
that every person will be empowered to challenge unconstitutional state
law, that such law will not be allowed to stand, and that successful
challenges will result in substantial cost in the form of attorney's fees.
d. Officials Never Enforced Statute
In denying attorney's fees, the court's reliance on the fact that the
Washington Secretary of State and Attorney General had never enforced
the term limits statute conflicts with its own assertion that non-
enforcement is irrelevant under § 1983.' 3 The weight of precedent,
previously discussed, establishes that even the threat of deprivation of
constitutional rights will support a claim under § 1983. 9' Thus, the issue
of enforcement becomes irrelevant to the importance of a fee award
under § 1988. The effective functioning of § 1983 and the assurance of
judicial access depend on the granting of fees.
The court's argument may be that, as the defendant officials have not
taken any personal unconstitutional action, they should not be required to
assume responsibility for the acts of the State. This argument ignores the
fact that suits are often brought, and fees awarded, against enforcement
officials, even though there would have been no need for a lawsuit or an
90. Id.
91. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290,295 (1981).
92. The fact that the particular statute at issue in a § 1983 challenge is the result of a voters'
initiative raises considerations which are beyond the scope of this Commeht. Individuals must be
empowered to vindicate their civil rights when those rights are infringed upon by state law, but it is
open to debate whether the state as an entity should bear the cost of that vindication when private
voters are responsible for the law. From a broad perspective, paying a fee award from state funds
always penalizes the voting citizenry to the extent that tax revenue fills the state coffers. For the
vindication of rights infringed by a state statute, regardless of its origin, this Comment assumes that
the state and its voters are synonymous and the state, as an entity, will bear the cost.
93. Thorsted v. Gregoire, 841 F. Supp. 1068, 1083.
94. See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
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injunction if the state legislature had not taken unconstitutional action. 5
Enforcement officials are routinely held to answer for unconstitutional
laws that they had no hand in creating.96 The Tenth Circuit has held that
failure to take official action to enforce a statute is not a special
circumstance rendering a fee award unjust.97
As the officials responsible for implementing state law, the defendants
in Thorsted were the representatives of the State of Washington. They
were being sued in their official capacities and any attorney's fees
awarded would be paid from state funds, consistent with the legislative
intent behind § 1988.98 Consequently, the State would be penalized for
the enactment of an unconstitutional statute; the defendants would not
assume personal responsibility in any real sense.99
The statement that the defendant officials' willingness to enforce the
term limits statute is "only the minimum their oaths of office require" is
simply an assertion that they had acted in good faith and were only
performing their official duties. As will be discussed in the next section,
good faith is, at best, a questionable special circumstance.
e. State Officials Acted in Good Faith
Six federal circuits, as well as the Washington Supreme Court, have
held that the fact that state officials acted in good faith in enforcing or
enacting an unconstitutional law is not a special circumstance justifying a
denial of attorney's fees."° The Ninth Circuit has stated that good faith
may be considered in applying § 1988,10' but severely limited that
95. In re Kansas Cong. Dists. Reapportionment, 745 F.2d 610, 612 (10th Cir. 1984) (quoting
Supreme Ct. of Va. v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 739 (1980)).
96. See Finberg v. Sullivan, 555 F. Supp. 1068, 1071 (E.D. Penn. 1982) (holding that insulating
enforcement officials from suit, "merely because they were complying with existing rules which they
lacked the capacity to change," would fiustrate the purpose of § 1988).
97. Wilson v. Stocker, 819 F.2d 943, 951 (10th Cir. 1987).
98. S. Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5913
("[I]t is intended that the attorneys' fees, like other items of costs, will be collected either directly
from the official, in his official capacity, from funds of his agency or under his control, or from the
State or local government .... .") (citations omitted).
99. In fact, since the defendants acted in good faith, the Ninth Circuit held that they cannot be
liable in their personal capacities. Teitelbaum v. Sorenson, 648 F.2d 1248, 1251 (9th Cir. 1981).
100. See Bills v. Hodges, 628 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir. 1980); Love v. Mayor of Cheyenne, Wyo.,
620 F.2d 235,236 (10th Cir. 1980); Bond v. Stanton, 630 F.2d 1231, 1234 (7th Cir. 1980); Holley v.
Lavine, 605 F.2d 638, 646 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 913 (1980); Nadeau v. Helgemoe,
581 F.2d 275, 280 (Ist Cir. 1978); Brown v. Culpepper, 559 F.2d 274, 278 (5th Cir. 1977);
Jacobsen v. City of Seattle, 98 Wash. 2d 668, 676, 658 P.2d 653, 657 (1983).
101. Aho v. Clark, 608 F.2d 365, 367 (9th Cir. 1979).
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holding in Teitelbaum v. Sorenson.102  In Teitelbaum, the court
questioned the relevance of good faith and stated that good faith alone is
not a special circumstance justifying a denial of fees. 3 State officials
will presumably often act in good faith where the constitutionality of a
particular law is unclear. The court in Teitelbaum recognized the danger
of this for § 1988, reaffirming that fee awards must remain the rule rather
than the exception. It stated that denying fees where a defendant acts in
good faith will defeat the incentive goals of § 1988, as most defendants
will be able to prove at least arguable good faith."°4
The Teitelbaum court makes another argument that is noteworthy.
The legislative history of § 1988 states that the statute was a response to
the Supreme Court's holding in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v.
Wilderness Society."°5 Despite its holding that Congress must determine
under which federal legislation attorney's fees may appropriately be
awarded, the Court in Alyeska stated that a fee award is always
appropriate when the state defendant has acted in bad faith. 6 If
Congress had intended that attorney's fees be awarded only where the
defendant acted in bad faith, § 1988 would have been unnecessary and
superfluous legislation."°7
In order to be consistent with the holding of the Ninth Circuit, and the
purpose and efficacy of § 1988, the Thorsted court should have rejected
good faith as a special circumstance. In any event, the defendants' good
faith cannot stand alone, in light of the inadequacy of the other identified
special circumstances.
f Case of First Impression
The sixth special circumstance identified by the Thorsted court was
that the case was one of first impression in federal court, and that the
defendants had done nothing to increase the cost of litigation beyond
what would have been necessary to settle the issue. This argument
ignores the fact that an unconstitutional state law occasioned the
controversy. Absent a term limits statute that infringed the civil rights of
102. 648 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1981).
103. Id. at 1250.
104. Id. at 1251.
105. 421 U.S. 240 (1975). See S. Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5909.
106. Alyeska, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59.
107. Teitelbaum, 648 F.2d at 1250.
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Washington voters and congressional candidates, there would have been
no cost at all to the plaintiffs. A primary function of § 1988 is to force
the state to bear the cost of its unconstitutional action.0 8 As the
representatives of Washington state, the defendants in Thorsted had to
answer the plaintiffs' challenge. The state should not benefit from
inventing a novel way to infiinge civil rights.
The Ninth Circuit has expressed doubt that Congress intended the
novelty of a claim to justify a denial of attorney's fees under § 1988."9
To the contrary, the novelty of a civil rights claim should counsel in
favor of an award of attorney's fees. In Johnson v. Georgia Highway
Express, Inc., the Fifth Circuit emphasized the extra effort required in
cases where the law is new or unsettled and the concomitant need to
attract competent counsel.11° The court stated that the atorney in a novel
case should be compensated for accepting the challenge.'11
Encouraging private litigants to bring cases of first impression through
the promise of a fee award is also consistent with the goals of §§ 1983
and 1988. The invalidation of an unconstitutional state law safeguards
the rights of numerous persons by foreclosing the possibility of future
state enforcement. The efforts of the private litigant in such a case may
also ensure the protection of whole classes of persons by securing
previously unrecognized constitutional rights.l1 2
g. State Legislation Presumed Constitutional
The court's final justification for the denial of attorney's fees in
Thorsted was that the state defendants were powerless to avoid a full trial
because state legislation is presumed to be constitutional until proven
otherwise. This argument would support a denial of fees. in every § 1983
challenge to state legislation. In light of the number of civil rights cases
brought to invalidate unconstitutional laws, this result would be contrary
to the broad protective goals of §§ 1983 and 1988.
If the gravamen of the court's argument is that it is unfair to
"penalize" the Secretary of State and Attorney General when they were
unable to avoid prosecution, the argument must succumb to the same
rebuttals already stated. Namely, the defendants in Thorsted were
108. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908,5913.
109. Teitelbaum, 648 F.2d at 1249.
110. 488 F.2d 714, 718 (5th Cir. 1974).
111. Id. at718.
112. Teitelbaum, 648 F.2d at 1250.
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representatives of the State of Washington, they were sued as
Washington officials, and the cost of attorney's fees would fall solely
and squarely on the state.
h. Contrary Authority
The Thorsted court dismissed authority that ran contrary to the special
circumstances it had identified, stating that none of the contrary cases
involved the "totality of circumstances" present in Thorsted. In light of
the previous discussion, this argument is untenable. The special
circumstances cited by the court to justify a denial of attorney's fees
cannot withstand the contrary force of precedent and legislative intent.
No aggregate of losing arguments should be allowed to build a winning
one. Consequently, the Thorsted plaintiffs should have been awarded
their reasonable attorney's fees under § 1988.
I. ATTORNEY'S FEES SHOULD BE UNIFORMLY AWARDED
FOR § 1983 CLAIMS THAT INVALIDATE STATE LAW
The recovery of attorney's fees under § 1988 is crucial to the dual
goals of § 1983 and other federal civil rights laws. Fee awards provide
practical access to judicial remedies for civil rights violations. Fee
awards also deter state infringement by invalidating unconstitutional
legislation and establishing pecuniary penalties for state violators. In a
climate of rising legal costs and expanding legislation, the role of fee
recovery in private vindication and public deterrence cannot be
overstated.
The value of encouraging private civil rights challenges through fee
recovery is particularly compelling in cases that seek to invalidate
unconstitutional state laws. An unconstitutional state statute creates the
potential for widespread deprivation of individual rights. Whereas a
challenge to specific state action has a limited preventive effect, by
establishing legal precedent that may alter the future behavior of state
officials, the invalidation of an unconstitutional statute guarantees the
prevention of future deprivations of rights under that law. One "private
attorney general," through a single court contest, can secure the civil
rights of many persons. Consequently, the efforts of such private
attorneys general must be empowered and, particularly in cases such as
Soundgarden and Thorsted where only prospective relief is sought
without attendant damages to offset legal costs, fee recovery is vital to
that empowerment. In the future, courts should liberally recognize
Washington Law Review
challenges to state statutes under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and where those
challenges succeed, attorney's fees should be almost universally
awarded.
A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Should Be Liberally Applied
Consistent with Congress' instructions to the court, to use the most
expansive and effective remedies available to enforce the civil rights
laws,"'13 the courts should liberally allow challenges to state statutes
under § 1983. The ability of an unconstitutional state statute to render
profound and pervasive deprivations of civil rights makes effective
private enforcement particularly important.
A primary purpose of § 1983 is to remedy the deprivation of civil
rights." '4 Consequently, when a court considers the viability of a claim
under § 1983, the crucial, and only pertinent, inquiry is whether the
plaintiff's civil rights have been deprived. Actual criminal prosecution
under a statute is not necessary before a person's federal constitutional or
legal rights can be infringed. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized
the significant injury caused by the chilling effect that unconstitutional
legislation may exert on individual rights."' The harmfal self-censorship
engendered by such a chilling presupposes a lack of official
enforcement.'16 The presence or absence of state enforcement is a
technical distinction collateral to the practical issue of whether a
deprivation of civil rights has occurred.
When a statute chills free speech or expression and causes
demonstrable and detrimental self-censorship, as was the case in
Soundgarden, the applicability of § 1983 as a remedy is clear."' Courts
have held that even the threat of official enforcement of an
unconstitutional statute is sufficient to support a claim under § 1983.18
This holding is presumably based on the idea, similar to the chilling
theory, that a pre-enforcement statute may still exert an influence on
current behavior. In Thorsted, for instance, the term limits statute
113. S. Rep. No. 10 11, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in 1976 U. S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5910-
11.
114. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
115. Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383,393 (1988).
116. Id. at 393.
117. See Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. School Dist., 77 F.2d 1046, 1055 (5th
Cir. 1985), afl'd, 489 U.S. 782 (1989).
118. See In re Kansas Cong. Dists. Reapportionment, 745 F.2d 610, 612 (10th Cir. 1984). See
also Thorsted v. Gregoire, 841 F. Supp. 1068, 1083 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
Vol. 70:491, 1995
Attorney's Fees
prevented voters, campaign personnel, and potential candidates from
preparing for the upcoming election, as it was unclear which candidates
would be eligible to run for office. The mere existence of
unconstitutional statutes may affect the acts of those to whom they apply
through the threat of reprisal or prosecution. Individuals should have the
right to remove that threat and its ill-effects without having to first await
official actions against them.
Sound public policy dictates that § 1983 challenges should be
encouraged. If such challenges successfully invalidate state law, then the
litigant has served the role of "private attorney general" as envisioned by
Congress and has secured the rights of all those to whom the law applies.
If the challenge fails, the litigant will be forced to bear his or her own
legal costs. Moreover, the precedent so established should dissuade
future challenges to the incident law which are of the same or a similar
nature and dissipate any doubts as to the validity of the statute in
question. Furthermore, § 1983 itself discourages frivolous suits by
allowing an award of attorney's fees against a party that files or
prosecutes a civil rights claim in bad faith." 9 In light of the importance
of the civil rights laws, the crucial role of private enforcement in their
vindication, and the particularly harmful nature of unconstitutional
statutes, challenges to those statutes under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 should be
almost universally allowed.
B. Fee Awards Should Rarely Be Denied Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988
Once a plaintiff has successfully challenged an unconstitutional state
law under § 1983, the fee award analysis under § 1988 is greatly
simplified. If a litigant successfully invalidates a state statute, an award
of attorney's fees should rarely be denied.
In order to qualify as a prevailing party under § 1983, and be eligible
for a fee award under § 1988, a civil rights plaintiff must alter the legal
relationship between the parties, and modify the defendant's behavior in
a manner that is directly beneficial to the plaintiff at the time of
judgment. 20 The invalidation of a state statute alters the legal
relationship between the plaintiff and defendant and modifies the
defendant's behavior by removing a source of state authority and
foreclosing the option of prosecution or reprisal based on that authority.
Assuming a deprivation of rights sufficient to support the claim under
119. S. Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5912.
120. Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S. Ct. 566, 573 (1992).
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§ 1983, the invalidation of the statute will necessarily bonefit the plaintiff
by removing the cause of that deprivation. Consequently, when a state
statute is declared unconstitutional under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiffs
have prevailed within the meaning of § 1988.
Once prevailing party status is established, all that remains to justify a
denial of a fee award is the issue of special circumstances which would
render an award unjust. It must serve as a backdrop to this inquiry that
Congress and the Qourts have repeatedly affirmed that attorney's fee
awards must remain the rule rather than the excepticn if federal civil
rights laws are to be more than hollow pronouncements that citizens
cannot afford to enforce."' In cases such as Soundgarden and Thorsted,
where private litigants have challenged and invalidated unconstitutional
state laws, the special circumstances inquiry should alo include certain
additional considerations.
In cases successfully challenging state law, the special circumstances
analysis should not focus on the state defendants. If a plaintiff has
prevailed under § 1983 and secured the invalidation of a state statute, it
follows that a civil rights infiingement has already occurred and the goal
of deterrence has failed. The state has an opportmity to avoid the
enactment of unconstitutional laws. State legislatures have the means to
obtain staff legal review regarding proposed legislation and should do so
to narrow the possibility of passing statutes which are repugnant to the
federal constitution or laws. Moreover, those who propose voters'
initiatives should be held to a similar standard and not be permitted to
entertain the fiction that the will of the people may sanction
unconstitutional action. If a civil rights suit nonetheless arises, the state
has a second chance under § 1983 to show that the law at issue is not, in
fact, causing a deprivation of civil rights.
If the issue of special circumstances under § 1988 hes been reached in
a particular statutory challenge, it presupposes that a civil rights
deprivation has occurred as a result of state law. T'his fact alone is
sufficient to trigger the plaintiff's right to a remedy under § 1983 and
attorney's fees are a crucial component of that remedy. Fee award
analysis that focuses on the state at this point is misplaced; the state had
opportunities to both avoid and defend its actions, and an infringement of
civil rights has nonetheless been found to exist. Analysis that focuses on
defendant enforcement officials is similarly misplaced, as such officials
are merely conduits through whom the state is held accountable. There




will be instances where even the most diligent good faith efforts of a
state legislature or voters' coalition result in the passage of an
unconstitutional law. However, once a deprivation of civil rights occurs,
the cost of vindicating those rights must be borne by the state.
Where a state statute has been successfully challenged, therefore, the
special circumstances analysis should focus on the plaintiff. An
appropriate inquiry would be the necessity of a fee award to assure
judicial access to the plaintiff or plaintiffs in question. The Soundgarden
case provides a good example. A number of the Soundgarden plaintiffs
were successful artists with lucrative recording careers who could
presumably have absorbed the cost of litigation. Furthermore, even
absent the possibility of a fee recovery, those plaintiffs would likely have
brought suit, as the statute at issue was significantly impacting their
livelihood. It could be argued that, under the circumstances, a fee
recovery was unnecessary to either encourage or empower the specific
civil rights challenge.
However, a plaintiffs economic autonomy alone should not support a
fee denial. The party whose civil rights have been injured should not be
required to bear the cost of remedy simply because he or she has the
means. A basic tenet of § 1988 is that "those who violate the Nation's
fundamental laws are not to proceed with impunity."'" States must bear
the cost of successful challenges to state law. Such accountability serves
to punish the unconstitutional action at issue, to deter future action
through the threat of monetary penalty, and to encourage civil rights
challenges. The fact that a particular plaintiff can afford to pay
attorney's fees does not vitiate either the incentive or deterrence goals of
§ 1988. Civil rights litigants must be encouraged to vindicate federal
rights without being concerned that their income may cross some
unknown threshold and render them ineligible for a fee award. More
importantly, state legislatures should not receive the message that they
may legislate with impunity when their legislation targets only affluent
entities or segments of society.
A plaintiff's ability to bear his or her own legal costs should only
support a denial of attorney's fees if other special circumstances exist as
well. In situations where a fee award was not crucial to provide a
plaintiff judicial access, it would be relevant that the deterrence effect of
an award was also diluted. Under those circumstances, the fact that the
statute was adopted by voters' initiative, as was the case in Thorsted,
would be a viable special circumstance, due to the difficulty of sending
122. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5910.
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deterring messages to a body of private voters. Other specific elements
of, a case that tended to render the deterrence goal of a fee award
ineffective or impossible would be relevant to the special circumstances
analysis.
The relative magnitude of the civil rights deprivation would be
relevant as well. A court could determine that a particular plaintiff,
rather than the state through its taxpayers, should bear the cost of
vindicating relatively trivial civil rights deprivations. This special
circumstance would be closely related to the scenario described in the
legislative history of § 1988 regarding the plaintiff who litigates in bad
faith." While Congress has authorized a court to require such a litigant
to bear the defendant's legal costs, 24 incorporating the "frivolous" nature
of the suit into the special circumstances analysis provides the court with
some middle ground. If a particular civil rights litigant has not
demonstrated bad faith per se but is nonetheless attempting to remedy a
deprivation of rights that is insignificant or impacts few other persons,
the court could consider such a circumstance as counse~ting against a fee
award. The court could thereby express its disapproval for a litigant's
misuse of judicial resources without taking the decidedly harsh step of
shifting the defendant's costs to a party that has, technically, prevailed.
If the fundamental goals of access and deterrence canot be furthered
by a fee award in a particular case and the suit borders on the frivolous,
then the good faith of the defendant may be pertine:at to the special
circumstances inquiry. As discussed, the good faith of the defendant
should not be a primary special circumstance in successful statutory
challenges under § 1983. However, when the ability to achieve the basic
goals of the civil rights laws and the plaintiff's good faith are both
suspect, the defendant's good faith efforts would be a proper final factor
justifying a denial of attorney's fees.
Good faith in this context must include more than an honest belief in
the constitutionality of the specific statute or simple adherence to official
enforcement duties. The state should be required to demonstrate that it
took substantial steps prior to the passage of the offending legislation to
ensure its constitutionality. These steps should certainly include legal
consultation with staff attorneys or outside counsel and research into the
relevant legal policy and precedent. It would also be appropriate to
require the state to provide some opportunity for public input to allow
community experts or interest groups to be heard on the legal and




practical consequences- of the proposed law. The state should be
compelled to show that it actively considered the constitutionality of the
statute and took reasonable measures to avoid offending the federal
constitution or laws.
Only in the most extreme cases should special circumstances
surrounding the invalidation of a state law under § 1983 render an award
of attorney's fees unjust. As an initial matter, it should be functionally
impossible to advance the basic goals of § 1983, namely effective access
to judicial remedy and deterrence of future deprivations, through a fee
award. In addition, the plaintiffs should be shown to have litigated in
questionable faith in seeking a remedy for a relatively trivial
infringement of civil rights. Lastly, the state defendants should be
required to demonstrate good faith, consisting not merely of honest
dealing but of affirmative efforts to avoid enacting an unconstitutional
law. Only if all of these elements exist should the inequity of fee
recovery countermand the broad policy of empowering "private attorneys
general."
IV. CONCLUSION
Attorney's fees should rarely be denied in cases where
unconstitutional state laws have been invalidated under 42 U.S.C.
§ 198. A court's discretion to deny fees is, in all civil rights cases, very
narrow, and it is narrowed further by the nature of challenges to state
statutes. Unconstitutional statutes can exert pervasive influence on civil
rights without a single prosecution, and private challenges to those
statutes safeguard the rights of everyone to whom the law applies. The
Soundgarden and Thorsted cases are examples of plaintiffs serving the
role of "private attorneys general" and putting teeth into federal civil
rights legislation. Courts in Washington, and nationwide, must honor the
intent of Congress by liberally facilitating and rewarding that effort.

